Introduction
The notion of creating the perfect city or simply a`better' city is not new. Throughout the history of planning the profession has idealised the`good city', and especially the utopian city (or region, and so on) of our dreams and fantasies, as an object the discipline should strive to create in answer to the normative question, how should we live together in society (Bruton, 1974; Friedmann, 2002) ? In this context planning has been conceptualised as a practice of social guidance and reform driven by``some notion of the better good, the notion that cities could be made better'' (Bridge and Watson, 2000, page 506) . As Campbell and Marshall (1998, page 117) indicate, the choices which planning practitioners make are fundamentally about questions of good or bad, right or wrong. However, these are questions of normative value and relativity that preclude absolute clarity, although practitioners often treat the chosen values as truths and unquestionable cultural imperatives (Allmendinger and Gunder, 2005) . Consequently we suggest that strategic urban planning, for all its successes in striving for a better good, will inherently fail to achieve a perfect or utopian city; a city free of dysfunction, social marginalisation, or other trauma.
In this paper we seek to challenge the normative prescriptive role of strategic urban-planning practice. In effect, we challenge what has traditionally been regarded as the essence of strategic or`forward' planning: the plan as a statement of what the city ought to become, of what ought to happen, with``the master plan as a product, a discrete guide to a fixed form of future development'' (Dyckman, 1964 , page 224).
Planning as urban therapeutic Michael Gunder
School of Architecture and Planning, National Institute of Creative Arts and Industries, The University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand; e-mail: m.gunder@auckland.ac.nz as developed by Z í iz ek and Laclau, to further understand how actants involved in strategic-planning practice identify and formulate urban issues as metaphorical urban shortcomings, or illnesses, and then implement their therapeutic resolution as urban policies. Central to this perspective are the Lacanian concepts of`lack' and the`Real'. Language and the human subject constituted in culture by language are incomplete. There is always a void, an incompleteness, which we as subjects strive to complete and make whole, but which we always fail to achieve. That which we cannot articulate, or even imagine, but what we unsuccessfully strive to know, is referred to as the Real in Lacanian-inspired thought. We create fantasy, illusion, and ideology to paper over our lack of ability to address the Real (Z í iz ek, 1989; 1997) . The concept of the Real suggests that absolute knowledge, the goal of scientific research and rationality within modern planning practice, is an impossibility (Hillier, 2003) . Further, the Lacanian Real adds a dimension of understanding as to why we can never define the`good' and why, to address this lack, we create imperfect constructs, illusions, and utopian visions which are doomed to fail. Finally, it is in encounters with this impossible Real that the astonishment, amazement (Bloch, 2000) , love, and even hate this sublime encounter incurs (Thrift, 2005) can at times induce a response where a better way of being (Bourriaud, 2002 , cited in Thrift, 2005 or hopeful conviviality (Thrift, 2005) may materialise.``Hope is in the darkness itself '' (Bloch, 2000, page 201) .
In forthcoming sections, we briefly trace the shift in meaning and practice of therapeutic planning over the past century. We first consider the notion of the`good' city as underpinning therapeutic forms of planning. We demonstrate how strategicplanning practice has been involved in identification of`lack' and in impossible attempts to fill the identified deficiencies and consider, using examples, how a specific symptom of unfitness or urban disease may be identified and how the specific resolution of urban illness may be determined and implemented. We find planning`lacking' as practised in its normative prescriptive mode.
In response we turn to the critical utopianism of Bloch (1986a; 1986b; , a Freudian-inspired predecessor of Lacan, to suggest a way forward in Bloch's immanent transcendent conceptualisation of hope. In comparison with Lacan's laying bare of the structure of desire and perpetual lack, Bloch (1986b) offers a conceptualisation of the good predicated on achievement of a subject no longer in a state of loss. Commencing with the basic desire, literally, of a full stomach (Bloch, 1986a, page 65) , this process towards anticipated, but unrealised, bodily completeness and idealised selffulfillment culminates in a sense of hope as creative possibility based on bodily needs for security, home, community, and so on, rather than as a Lacanian impossible promise rooted in instincts and the unconscious. Reflecting Blochian possibilities for transformation we suggest replacement of the transcendent term`utopian' by`utopic', as a practice which is critical, inclusive, and dynamic; performative rather than prescriptively normative.
We believe that strategic-planning practice offers a useful opportunity for experimentation with a Blochian approach, as strategic planning is, above all, concerned with change and intended forward movement. It is plurivocal in its participatory form, attempting to collate the often conflicting hopes and desires of a wide range of stakeholders in a plural organisation of spatiality. Utopic strategic planning would practise mediated hope or optimism that forecloses Lacanian melancholy and despair. Reference to an Australasian example demonstrates the (unfulfilled) potential of such an approach, once strategic planners relax their strict regulatory control.
In conclusion, we propose a consideration of agonistic hope that may be`embodied' in a Blochian therapeutic response to urban planning. This is a response by which planners acknowledge the long-existing role of planning practice as providing therapeutic direction. However, rather than seeking an`ideal' solution, or best cure, for urban problems, acting as the instrument of imposition of a specific utopian spatial good', we advocate a role in which planning may facilitate an agonistic construction or constructionism for multiple trajectories of utopic performativity rather than any hegemonic utopian`good'.
The good city, therapeutic planning, and the delirium of utopià`P lanning as ideology formulates all the problems of society into questions of space _ [W]hat are represented are healthy and diseased spaces. The planner should be able to distinguish between sick spaces and spaces linked to mental and social health which are generators of this health. As physicians of space, he [sic] should have the capacity to conceive of an harmonious social space, normal and normalizing.' ' Lefebvre (1996, page 99) In this section we give a brief overview of conceptualisations of the`good' from Plato to the present, and how notions of the`good life' are intrinsically linked to those of thè good city'. Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of the good are centred on accounts of proper human functioning, of practical wisdom and good judgment ( phronesis).
Plato, in The Republic (1992), makes claims about how typically`good' and`bad' cities would be arranged economically and politically, whilst acknowledging their utopian counterfactuality (Burnyeat, 1992) . A Platonic consideration of the good directly inspired the utilitarian writings of Bentham and Mill, and thus indirectly influenced the fundamental spirit of rational comprehensive planning as seeking to achieve the greatest good of the greatest number (Friedmann, 1987) . For Plato and rational comprehensive planners even in the 21st century (MacDonald, 2005) , moral actions are guaranteed by`correct' knowledge of the`absolute good' or utopian ideal. Like Friedmann, we seek to challenge such absolutist notions. The concept of utopia has traditionally been regarded as``a blueprint for a desired world which is _ located in present day concerns'' (Parker, 2002, page 10) . It embodies a movement in time^space towards something`better', ideally``where goodness reigns and everyone lives in harmony'' (Hardy, 2000, page 55 ). Yet everyone's idea of utopia will differ; some conceptualisations only slightly, whereas others will be inevitably conflictual (for example, the ideal worlds of drug barons and narcotics officers). All are dreams of some form of organised`order'. Although planners and politicians may not discuss how to realise Plato's Republic or More's (1965 More's ( [1516 ) Utopia, they have discussed, and continue to discuss, contemporary dreams or fantasies of good cities. From Fourier to Saint-Simon and Comte, through Howard, Geddes, Lloyd Wright, Le Corbusier and the Congress Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne, and the British New Towns movement, to the theoretical work of Harvey and Sandercock and the physical dreamings of Moses in New York and the New Urbanists such as Duany, Plater-Zyberg, and Katz, authors' imaginaries have been (explicit or implicit) visions of a better world where``the ills of the present day are banished to another space and time'' (Pinder, 2002, page 233) . As Pinder explains, in most visions, aspects of space are privileged under the assumption that social transformation will follow. Planners have thus therapeutically sought to improve the behaviour of individuals through environmental design in search of a``city of salvation'' (Pinder, 2002, page 233) . (1) Planning practice has long sought to be therapeutic in its resolution of the city's ills (Rose, 1994) , though as Osborne and Rose (1999) indicate, there has been a distinct shift in application of the term. The passage from Lefebvre (1996) , cited above, epitomises a more medically implicit metaphor of ailing urban areas, traceable back to the institutionalisation of town planning in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a direct result of widespread outbreaks of cholera, typhoid, and so on:``sickness is a pathology of space that may be governed away by such means as pure water, sew [er] age, disposal of refuse, and the like'' (Osborne and Rose, 1999, page 742) .
Illness and the courting of death as a preliminary to healthy revitalisation and/or the temporary avoidance of death through the sustaining of health are powerful metaphors (Hillier and Gunder, 2005) . Hence the frequent use, in strategic-planning documents, of``hypochondriac geographies'' (Baeten, 2002b) of the urban environment as a sick, dysfunctional, or overweight and unfit human body in need of therapeutic cure (Hoffman et al, 2000; Lefebvre, 2003, page 157) . This is the cure which planning purports to provide via provision of instrumental means, or strategies, to create the utopian fantasy of the healthy city or region. The fantasy is a dream where all residents may attain empowerment, happiness, and comfort in their enjoyment of life if only a perceived lack can be overcome, be it one of economic competitiveness, social harmony, efficient mobility, or other identified general urban ailments or specific blights (Gunder, 2003b, pages 288^289) .
In such situations, therapists (planners) claim to have expert knowledge and expert technique free of ideological bias (Baum, 1995) , whereas humans have been socialised in modernity to trust professional experts and therapeutic doctors' authority (Rose, 1999, pages 132^133) . Therapy also addresses the fundamental ethical question of who we are and how we should live. As stated above, such questions have informed the prescriptive idea or ideal of the`good city', the`good environment', the`good planning process', and so on (Gunder, 2005 ). Arnstein's (1969) famous`ladder' of citizen participation locates therapeutic participation as only one step above manipulation. For Arnstein, therapy is a form of domination by professional elites emphasising a lack of citizen power. In Arnstein's understanding of`planning as therapy', participation is deployed to calm citizens and to`make them feel better'. At best it allows the public tò let off steam' with little regard by the organising planners for the citizens' dreams, visions and desires, and, especially, for their dissatisfactions.
Planning practice is often centrally involved in the processes of identification of lack and its resolution (Gunder, 2003a; 2003b; Yiftachel, 1995) . Indeed, planning may play a key role in depoliticising much of this hegemonic function by introducing what appears to be a technical rationality to the identification and resolution of an urban problem, particularly if worded in dominant discourses of planning and wider cultural imperatives. In this role, planners quantify the politically qualitative lack as a measurable symptom. A lack of economic competitiveness thereby becomes a lack of transport-efficient urban form, adequate infrastructure, or available commercial land for development. A perceived lack of safety and security becomes symptomised as high crime rates and antisocial behaviour to be`cured' through`good' urban design. Laclau (1996, page 122) argues that the construction of the universal is a social operation and the constructed universal is thus a``pragmatic social construction'': a vision or utopia. However, this`vision' is inevitably contaminated by particularity. It is a`relative' universal which often serves a hegemonic function for specific powerful groups with vested interests:``precisely because the universal place is empty, it can be occupied by any force, not necessarily democratic'' (Laclau, 1996 , page 65). The vision of dominant groups (such as professional experts, vocal residents' groups or political elites) attempts to fill and resolve the identified deficiency. It serves the perspectives and perceived needs of the society's wider population and is likely to gain popular support, while possibly also achieving specific narrow corporatist, or other tangential aims. Of course, the identification of a lack and its hegemonic resolution are both highly political and ideological (as is any deconstruction of them) representing the``incommensurability between the ethical and the normative'' (Laclau, 2000, page 81) .
Utopias are unachievable ideal objects that stimulate and tease us with their desirability, yet seldom if ever, materially or otherwise, successfully deliver. There is always nonfulfilment of what is desired:``a dream pursued and found vain, wanting, and destructive'' (Raban, 1974; in Pinder, 2002, page 233) . The very language that describes any desired utopia inherently fails to be complete: it always lacks something in its prescription and our inherent desire to fill this lack perpetually creates further desire (Lang, 2003, page 249) . Utopias are one manifestation of Z í iz ek's (1989) sublime object of ideology, which, though remaining out of sight or falling short of full symbolic conceptualisation, still has a profound impact. In this way, a material object or goal is``elevated to the status of the impossible Thing'' (Z í iz ek, 1989, page 71). Achieving the utopian ideal (the impossible Thing) could entail destruction of the very living organism whose condition it is supposed to improve.
For your own good: a new form of therapy Pupavac (2004^05) identifies a specific shift towards a different kind of therapeutic approach towards the end of the 20th century. There has been a marked shift in planning practice, as in many other professional disciplines, from an emphasis on highly regulated city-spaces and land uses (and a relative lack of regulation of individuals) to highly regulated individuals whose desires are directed``in the most appropriate and productive fashions'' (Rose, 1999, page 90) . In addition, rather than emphasising negative aspects of illness or dis-ease, spatial planning documents stress the positive attributes of attaining and maintaining good health. Planning policies promulgate``new ways of planning life and approaching predicaments, and disseminate new procedures for understanding oneself and acting upon oneself to overcome dissatisfactions, realise one's potential, gain happiness and achieve autonomy'' (Rose, 1999, page 90) .
Consequently, rather than the state imposing traditional authoritarian commands on its subjects, the contemporary state encourages the subject to participate (both in the mainstream economy, via employment, and in influencing the allocation of resources in disciplinary areas such as planning), to choose, to consume, and hence to enjoy a`good' life (Gunder, 2005) . In complex and subtle ways, through the joint efforts of the therapist (for example, planners) and the client (local actants), problems are re/mis/shaped according to certain frameworks or repertoires (Rose, 1996) .
Distinct planning techniques are often regarded as embodying`good' therapeutic practice. In Australasia, and elsewhere, new urbanist design currently epitomises the urban therapeutic. Such design techniques include crime prevention through urban design, which is also believed to engender neighbourliness, community building, social capital, and, hence, sustainability. Individuals need to learn techniques to internalise behaviours such as looking after the welfare of others and the environment through neighbourhood vigilance and increased social interaction; using public transport for sustainability; and undertaking healthy obesity-reducing activities, such as walking to access services and facilities (Dixon and Dupuis, 2003; Talen, 2002) . This new therapeutic paradigm effectively seeks to create new subjectivities able to cultivate self-competencies leading to a`better' life and a`better city' (see Levitas, 1990) . Sandercock (2004, page 139), for instance, writes that planning can effect social transformation through``a successful therapeutically orientated approach to managing our coexistence in the shared spaces of neighbourhoods, cities, and regions'' where it may empower à`c apacity for collective growth''. Development of such self-competencies is theoretically empowering both for the citizens and for professional officers. In so doing, planning practice obtains an ethical legitimacy. It gives the appearance of being both democratic (as people are empowered to make choices for themselves) and therapeutic as it is in the interests of those over whom it is exercised. Such an approach requires careful critical analysis, however. Its ideas leave themselves open to Foucauldian critiques of self-serving and self-deluding artful governmentality (Gunder, 2003a; Hillier, 2002) . Further, they are still fantasy constructs seeking a desirous utopian city. They constitute what is the dominant reality of today of the visions of the good city of competitive globalisation (Gunder, 2005) . They define a community, or so their proponents believe, necessary to attract thè correct' dynamic and innovative talented knowledge people through a romanticised nostalgia for rescuing``something expansive, utopian, essential, dispersed in the past'' (Bloch, 2000, page 189 ). Yet, as Bloch (2000, page 188) comments, these``mostly infantile wishes fill the abyss of what we dream'', serving mainly to suffocate immanence; a potential for moving forward.
The good, the bad, and the ugly: Australasian fantasies of designer cities Planners are taught to cure our urban woes. Planning education not only supplies epistemic knowledge and practices, it also shapes students' dispositions to those of the profession by supplying a range of ideal, or ideological, prescriptive labels or signifiers to negate, or normalise, those spaces that are dysfunctional and diseased, and to facilitate communities in the creation of harmonious and healthy social spaces. Social and environmental justice, sustainability, smart growth, and new urbanism, are typical prescriptive signifiers [or`plagues of fantasies' for Z í iz ek (1997) ] that are inculcated in students to create a`better', even a utopian, world (Gunder, 2004, page 303) . These`solutions' are inherently ideological, rather than technical in their prescriptive content (Gunder, 2003b) , even though it is planning technologies that shape and normatively determine how our built spaces`ought' to be. Each of these prescriptive planning signifiers, and especially the utopian trace embedded within them, constitutes an unobtainable transcendental ideal that influences our planning and wider urban behaviours, while at the same time such singularly focused processes induce us tò`c onstruct and share illusions and fantasies _ that we are somehow achieving this impossible task'' (Gunder, 2005, page 193) .
In this section we demonstrate how planning as a process of ideological formulation may engage the metaphor of human health to the spatial built environment for reasons of economic`development'. For instance, in the context of global competitiveness a city or region may be regarded as sick if it cannot compete economically (Gunder, 2005) . It will fail to gain empowerment, enjoyment, and comfort for its residents, fail to attract the`correct' talented workers necessary for its utopian vision, and perhaps lose its labour pool to other locations. In this metaphor, the Z í iz ekiaǹ Thing' negatively affecting the health, that is, competitiveness, of the social organism requires therapeutic attention to make it better. We suggest, however, that rather than addressing pathological spatial ills standing in the way of enjoyment, planning practice may actually, in some instances, produce adverse, or dystopian, social outcomes.
Elsewhere, Gunder (2003b, page 289) documents the importance that metaphor, including that of the healthy body, has played in shaping urban policy. This metaphor of urban health and fitness is particularly powerful, for as each subject knows, the failure of an individual's health has a potentially fatal outcomeödeath! Hence there is a strong normative desire to want to`sustain' our environments and urban spaces in a healthy manner. These normative judgments lay the ground for ideological articulation with regard to urban spatial form (Scho« n and Rein, 1994) .
Consider the following statement published by a regional council with a core remit to provide planning and transportation direction to a population of 1.2 million residing within a 5000 km 2 area of New Zealand (http://arc.govt.nz, 29 September 2004).`S mart Growth is Smart Living Ensuring our cities remain economically competitive in the twenty-first century will be challenging. A visiting speaker from the United States advises against urban obesity ... . Many US cities are overweightöbulging at the edges and unfit as a result. Cities that follow a land-use diet of selective intensification are likely to have a competitive edge'' (ARC, 2004, page 1). This is not the first time a trope of lack of fitness has been deployed by this particular authority. Gunder (2003b, page 288) identified another use of the same metaphor of obesity and unfitness by Auckland Regional Council five years previously in an article, Auckland's Internal Growing Pains, that sought to prescribe nodal and corridor density intensification to manage urban growth.`I f cities are people then Auckland is in the period of early adulthood. It's done a lot of its growing up, got much of its bone structure in place, now it's starting to`put on the beef '. But is it doing this in a sustainable manner? Is it putting on too much fat and not enough muscle?'' (Waddell and Pollock, 1999, page 9) . Here the health metaphor sought to illustrate Auckland as lacking fitness. The region needs to discard the flab of metropolitan sprawl and develop into a fit and healthy, that is, competitive and desirable, city. Flab is turned to muscle and strength formed via self-discipline and exercise. Intensification is prescribed for Auckland as the mechanism to`correct' its current condition and to achieve the fitness goals of sustainability and competitiveness. Each resident must play a part in the region gaining this desired state. Inherent in contemporary projects of urban governance is the notion that everyone has the obligation to contribute, in this case, to the prospect of sustainable urban fitness, for``rights in the city are as much about duties as they are about entitlements'' (Osborne and Rose, 1999, page 752) . To ensure that the public act in an appropriate, dutiful manner, policies include mechanisms of public education, travel-demand management (ARC, 2003) , and school, youth, community, and industry awards promoting correct behaviours in facilitating fit and lean outcomes that are environmentally sound (ARC, 2005) .
Concerns to promote better conditions of life in many Western urban cities (such as in Auckland above), centre on a particular reading of the good as`the best quality of life' for a small group of residents (Findlay et al, 1988) or for nonresident entrepreneurs. To this end, in his widely influential work Florida (2000; focuses on provision of amenities, environmental quality, and social tolerance; all factors which can be``changed for the better, given the correct urban policies'' (McCann, 2004 (McCann, , page 1911 . Behind these visions of the good city (as in Auckland) lies the driving force of economic growth and the assumption that places with high quality of life (and urban design) for the professional classes will economically out-perform their competitor cities (Zo« llner, 2004) . Furthermore, there is an emphasis on strategic planning as a product, a resulting spatial form, rather than as a process. Economic and civic spatial boundaries are set and closure is achieved. There is likely to be little toleration of other alternative strategies or visions of the future.
To this end, the Urban Design Alliance of Queensland (UDAL), Australia, has developed an agenda for the achievement of`desirable' urban qualities. In the agenda it is proposed that``cities and towns must be: sustainable, liveable, viable, responsible; and memorable'', whilst``good urban places must be: connected, accessible, meaningful, legible; and humane'' (both quotes from Snow, 2004 , page 24, bullet points removed). A similar agenda is currently being implemented in New Zealand under the rubric of the New Zealand Urban Design Protocol (MfE, 2005) . This is a protocol that``aims to make towns and cities more successful'' through quality urban design (page 4). The document states that``we need to ensure that our towns and cities are successful places'' (page 2). The protocol further states (page 11) that``successful towns and cities are competitive, thriving, creative and innovative'' and``attract dynamic and innovative knowledge workers, entrepreneurs and companies'' as``they appeal to talented people because they offer a high quality of life'', and so on. We draw attention here to the imperatives articulated by use of the words`must' or`need to ensure' and the empty signifiers of the listed terms and ideas, which, as Snow points out, have to be`approached correctly'. We suggest, moreover, that such representations reveal more about``bourgeois urban desires, fantasies and fears than about the city itself '' (Baeten, 2002b, page 109) and worry that such powerful ideological fantasies will further serve to sustain the power of urban elites to the detriment of the already disadvantaged.
There has been largely unproblematised acceptance of the criteria developed by Florida and further implemented by organisations such as UDAL or New Zealand's Ministry for the Environment, leaving little room to question the definitions of, means to achieve, or consequences of terms such as`viable',`responsible', and`meaningful'. It is difficult to suggest that such motherhood statements are not`good things' and there is little scope for discussion of alternative visions and stories. Nevertheless, Sandercock (2004, page 136) has recently stated that even in such a world,``an underlying commitment to some notion of the good city or good society is ever present''. Z í iz ek, however, would give a principled refusal of any supposition of a knowledge of the good or ideal. A Z í iz ekian ethic would rather be to question the difficulties we have with what we take to be our`good' and the rivalries, masteries, and identifications such a supposition carries with it (Z í iz ek, 2001, page 167). The crucial issue then becomes one of ideology and the questions arise: the good city or society for whom? And with what implications for those excluded?
The inherent subjectivity of notions of the good is increasingly recognised. Mannheim (1960) and Rawls (1993) both indicated that different subjectivities make overall assessments of the good problematic. Sack (2003, page 20) also points out that what is often held to be a good use of place depends on whether the place is effective for the project supported by a particular group. For instance,``places of poverty, opium dens'', and so on,``can all be thought of as contributing to the diversity and complexity of the world'' (Sack, 2003, page 25) .`The good' is a highly debatable term.
On`ought' and other normatives Perceptions of the good rapidly transform into normative prescriptions of`ought'. Mannheim (1960, pages 234^236) provides a detailed explanation of how the normative`ought' inherently drives decisionmaking. Indeed, traditionally``there is a built-iǹ ought' in the very idea of planning'' (Cussen, 2000, page 130) . Witness the recurrence of`must',`should',`need',`ensure', and other imperatives in the urban-design statements cited above.
The`ought' is where the therapeutic becomes manifest in the notion that``we must make [reality] better'' (Sack, 2003, page 269, emphasis in original) . This problematic provides the key to the connections between planning practice, the good, and the impossible Real. In the rest of this paper we express our reservations about the assumed linkages between the utopian, the good or the healthy city, and the production by urban planners of a master plan or set of blueprints derived from an imaginary fantasy. We unpack the implications of strategic planning as seeking``the perfect balance between the`ought' and the`must' '' (Bauman, 2003, page 16) . That planning practice has always possessed a normative element does not necessarily imply that it is imperative to do so.
Far from curing the ills of the diseased city, many utopian attempts at social engineering through planning practice have produced dystopian consequences. These range from`sink' estates and`no-go' areas in British 1960s residential tower developments to insurrections in urban resettlement areas in Indonesia, the social exclusion of gated communities in the United States, and, more generally, against the reconstructed urban forms symbolic of the new Pax Americana. In attempting to construct a desired good city,`experts' or dominant groups may presume they know what is best, ignoring or silencing other alternatives. Utopianism is characterised by intolerance (Grey and Garsten, 2002) , especially of individual or minority opinions and needs, as all too often the fantasy takes over and coercion to comply occurs. Authors are increasingly recognising that``despair and hatred are the emotions involved in utopian thought'' (Amis, 2002, page 18) . In this context Bauman (2003, page 16) observes that utopias are``visions of a closely watched, monitored, administered and daily managed world _ a world in which prediction and planning would have staved off the play of chances _ the world of sages whose job was to secure the benevolence of the rulers and the happiness of the ruled.'' Moreover, Harvey (2000, page 167) asks whether the utopianism of spatial form that gets materialised can be anything other than`degenerate'. For instance the ideals of free-market economic rationalism have resulted in historical upheavals of urban docklands as capital has constructed, destroyed, and reconstructed waterfront landscapes in its image differentially. Materialisations of ideal forms involve the authoritarian creation of fixed and exclusive boundaries or closures of space (such as the geographical area of a strategic plan or the zoning of residential estates with a minimum lot size to exclude affordable housing), time (the duration of the plan), and ideas. Harvey (2000, page 183) indicates that closure is both fundamental and unavoidable and suggests that attempting to evade closure simply embraces``an agonistic romanticism of perpetually unfilled longing and desire''. Yet is this statement not a definition of the word`hope'?
Is nonfulfilment of planning therapeutic visions of the utopian good necessarily as melancholy as Harvey, Z í iz ek, and other critics would propose? The work of Sandercock (2003; suggests not. Sandercock's is an explicitly utopian vision of``therapeutic planning'' (2003, page 162) completely different from that envisaged by Arnstein (1969) . For Sandercock (2004, page 138) ,``the word therapy evokes an essential quality of community organisation and social planning'' which enables citizens to speak the unspeakable, to talk of fear, loathing, and hatred as well as of hopes and desires. In so doing, participants may develop processes of transformation, both of themselves and of their built environments``in ways that reflect cultural diversity and the subjective sense of belonging'' (Sandercock, 2003, page 151) . Sandercock (2004) recognises her explicit use of therapy in its psychological sense, acknowledging the importance of networks of relationships and of affect in many planning disputes.
The key to Sandercock's therapeutic planning is the possibility of transformation.`J ust as in successful therapy there is breakthrough and individual growth becomes possible, so too with a successful therapeutically oriented approach to managing our co-existence in the shared spaces of neighbourhoods, cities and regions, there is the capacity for collective growth' ' (2003, page 164; 2004, page 139) . This statement, however, reflects utopian and perhaps delusionary connotations of Freirean-inspired empowerment which have been problematised and largely critically rejected in recent social-work literature (see Forrest, 2000; Pease, 2002) . In her therapeutic planning Sandercock also concentrates on process rather than spatial form. She tends to assume that if the practice is`good' then the outcome will also be`good'; something which does not inevitably follow. (2) We do not wish to disparage Sandercock's``utopian impulse'' (1998, page 1) too much, however, as we believe that strategic-planning practice requires some element of hopeful looking forward and processes by which we might collectively work towards social and physical transformation.
Towards an agonistic hope: or, conquering the urge for transcendent vision? We have established that therapeutic utopian social aspirations, imagined musings, and political projects represent discursive organisations of space which attempt to fill the empty spaces or lacks (of texts and cities) with their own signifying substance. Utopias are discursive spatial figures which tell us more about the ideologies that produce them than about the cities and texts themselves. They are essentially undecidable,`a n anticipating, but blind, judgment'' (Marin, 1984, page 163) . Much strategic-planning practice appears to be of an inherently paradoxical nature in which transcendent therapeutic visions of a utopian good city are never far below the surface. In this section we explore the``psychological utopianism'' (Pietikainen, 2004) in Bloch's (1986a; work. Bloch was a Freudian-inspired Marxist scholar whose reading of Freud complements that by Lacan. Although Freud and Lacan may have been antiutopian thinkers, this does not imply that the basic assumptions of psychoanalysis do not contain psychoutopian elements. Moreover, Lacan's imaginary domain and the Real, rooted in dreams and past experiences, can be said to relate to Bloch's account of utopia in which the present`forward draws' a`Not-Yet-Conscious' psychologically represented in the future-laden`Not-Yet-Become' as a space of``concrete anticipation'' (Bloch, 1986a, page 127) . This is the utopian surplus of Bloch's``waking dream' ' (1986a, page 3; 2000, page 191) .
Both Bloch and Lacan recognise that the drive, utopia, and the Real are nonexisting, unsatisfiable attempts to fill``hollow spaces'' (Bloch, 1986a, page 46 ), yet most individuals with a sense of what might be`better' in their lives and environments express some form of utopian impulse in projecting themselves and their needs forward into the future.``The utopian impulse is an intrinsic part of what it means to be human' ' (Levitas, 2003b, page 4) . Such utopian visions are abstract, though frequently mediated with real possibility, directed, as Bloch (1986a, page 988) writes, toward thè`o bjectively possible Possible''. Critiquing Freud, Bloch (1986a) argues the importance of the subjective element of human experience and the grounding of psychological tendencies in corporeal needs (such as cravings of hunger, or positive wishing for a better life) rather than in the unconscious and Freudian or Lacanian emphasis on negativity, repression, and death. Bloch also regards humans as a``quite extensive' ' (1986a, page 14) and dynamic complex of drives which, individually or in combination, dominate behaviour differentially depending on context and circumstances (1986a, page 50); a notion with which we concur. Bloch's work thus offers a much broader impression of utopia for adoption in strategic planning practice. We term this broader view`utopic' (after Marin, 1984) .
The utopic is not a normative prescription, blueprint, or master plan, but rather a productive force. Utopic practice is performative,`wedging' itself in the space between reality and the Real:``transgression itself '' (Marin, 1984, page 197) . It reveals its ideological foundations. Moreover, it does not resolve contradiction:``transgression of a reality of norms and structures, in the institution, is not overcome; it is maintained (2) For further discussion of this point see Levitas's (2003a) exploration of different meanings of utopian process. Levitas distinguishes between process as the historical transition to utopia (process to utopia), process as utopia in itself (process as utopia), and processes of social change within utopia (process in utopia).
as contradiction and transgression in a figure`other' than reality'' (Marin, 1984, page 197) . It is the desire for a``better way of living'' (Levitas, 1990) which can agonistically incorporate different voices and ways of being, which is a trajectory rather than a point and which becomes an immanent transcendence rather than a transcendent vision.``The City will be born, like all true utopias, in the space of contradictory elements, not as the solution of their synthesis, but as the product of the force of difference opposing them'' (Marin, 1984, page 260) .
We are not against visionary strategic planning. We agree with Bauman (1976) and Marin (1984) about the importance of a critical attitude and a critical activity of imagining and thinking through the possibilities and desires of alternate future scenarios and of developing an impulse for change. Nevertheless, we propose that the normativè oughts' and`musts' become more tentative`coulds' which are agreed by nonhegemonic participatory, perhaps even socially affirmative, means. We agree with Pinder's (2002, page 238) call to challenge``taken-for-granted assumptions about the organisation of space and time, to interrupt dominant conceptions about linear temporal progression or good spatial form'' in attempts to open up new potentialities. These would be potentialities which embrace fluidity and accept struggle as inevitable and necessary aspects of urban environments. Rather than traditional strategic planning visions of fixed forms or points, such thinking entails envisaging a trajectory or an`approach toward' (Sargisson, 2000) ; a (nonstraight) line.
Instead of commencing with a catalogue of ills or`hypochondriac geographies' of the city', perhaps strategic planners could commence with finding out the actually existing utopian and often qualitative impulses in people's everyday lives (after Lefebvre, 1991; and with learning to recognise the fluidity, contingency, and immanence of both lives and impulses. This would be a Blochian practice of discerning the guiding images,``the utopian moments, if not the utopia, that have already taken shape everywhere'' (Gelke, 1988, page 34; cited in Anderson, 2002, page 215) .
Perhaps added to this approach might be a focus on a Z í iz ekian-inspired conceptualisation of ideology and fantasy. This is an awareness that we are all driven by our fundamental fantasies. Further, some dimensions of these fantasies may be shared and contribute to our joint-materialised constructions of social reality (Gunder and Hillier, 2004) . A transversing exposure of our dominant ideologies may help to deflate false actions, or our inability to act, and may even help us to remove initiative-robbing beliefs of false social compliance. Or, as Bloch (1986b, page 251) observes, free us from the superego's imperative of inhibition through``the rupture of original guilt''. Perhaps this might be a valid therapeutic`healthy' task for planning practitioners to undertake.
Bloch's three-volume The Principle of Hope (1986a ) and his earlier The Spirit of Utopia (2000 Utopia ( [1923 ) provide practical examples why utopian visions should not be limited to conventional blueprints of form and substance. His elaboration of utopian expression is based on movement:``I move'' (1986a, page 21); on explosion:``utopian function thus understands what is exploding'' (1986a, page 146); on searching``for what is far away'' (1986a, page 23); and on discovery:``discovering is itself actively utopian' ' (1986a, page 752) . Does planning, then, need vision? We argue that any loss of questioning`where to' (and the implicit questions of`why',`how', and`with what implications') risks paralysis. Yet we propose that truly affirmative and viable strategic visions are not something that can be presupposed as transcendent ideals, retaining implicit and unquestioned value as imperatives of rational judgment. Rather, any noncolonising strategic vision would inherently be open to challenge, rearticulation, and contestation. If we follow Bloch in discerning spatial expressions of hope through lived experience we can redefine envisioning as a productive movement towards something better that is immanent to everyday life. As Anderson (2002, page 216) writes, Bloch raises thè`i ndistinct, ephemeral experience of`hope' to the status of a`principle' ''. Hope is central to Blochian thought. Combined with detailed attention to the empirical complexities of the present, hope enables the present to be projected or stretched outside itself into the future. This is the`not-yet', described above, which embodies an immanent future as already always present. The``waking dream'' (Bloch, 2000, page 191) or hope of more and/or better thus plays an important role in Bloch's work as an impetus that moves people onward in attempts to overcome the Lacanian melancholy absence or lack of the utopian Real. However, the not-yet is undecided and unreachable. It is less the attainment or focus on a specific end and more a general and developing flow or trajectory of hope affected often by``the blind, empty jostling of chance'' (Bloch, 2000, page 270). The future, therefore, constitutes a realm of potentiality; of many futures rather than simply one future. It is composed of an infinite series of ongoing pilgrimages, not the imposition of one particular ideal form of salvation that displaces all other alternatives.
As Anderson (2002, page 216) indicates, one may explore (after Hudson, 1983 ) the influence on Bloch of the pluralist notion of the pragmatist James of the world as a multiverse rather than a universe. Such elements of pragmatism and pluralism are also implicit in the work of Sandercock (1998; and others who advocate the inclusion of a multiplicity of different voices and desires into planning practice. Sandercock's (2003, page 162 ) contemporary description of therapeutic planning would have planners involved in``dialogue and negotiation across the gulf of cultural difference, [and would] require its practitioners to be fluent in a range of ways of knowing and communicating''. Planners in practice would deal with the traditionally excluded to discover what is left out or erased from dominant cultures' articulated desires. Sandercock (2003, page 177) refers to therapeutic planning as a methodology that goes below the surface of actors' words to understand their real motivations and concerns, not just what is articulated by them.
Bloch reminds us that societies are patchworks of utopian dreams replete with expectant emotions, some positive, some negative. However, as Bloch (1986a, page 939) states,``the path _ is also full of ambiguities''. There are choices and alternatives where there are multiple visions of the good city. These range from antidotes to perceived inner-city dystopia, such as petit-bourgeois suburban utopias replete with swimming pools, yuppie utopias of waterfront gentrification, and the exclusive privatopias of gated communities (after Levitas, 2003a) to desires of the inner-city homeless for warm, safe havens at night, of junkies for high quality, cheap dope, clean needles, and safe injection sites, and of skaters for challenging, smooth, surfaces in the built environment, not subject to authoritarian intervention. Each of the above represent small pools of hope in the everyday; a desire, albeit unconscious, for a better future. Clearly, planning practice has traditionally served the visions of the dominant class, often at the expense of the excluded (Bloch's`citoyens'); something that Mannheim (1960) would term ideological rather than utopian. Planning as therapeutic is thus paradoxical. It is concerned with both Blochian (1986a)`Being-in-Possibility', a revealing through substance of individual persons' self-responsibility for their well-being, and also a`What-is-According-to-Possibility', a conditioning through laws.
We mentioned Harvey's (2000, page 183) claim above that boundaries are inherent to utopianism. The location of planning practice in the reality of development decisions and spatial built and natural environments raises a question over our advocacy of continuous, open processes. Some points of closure are inevitable. Roads, commercial buildings, schools, and so on, have to be constructed and/or demolished. Decisions have to be made. Refusal of closure may amount to evasion of one's professional duty, or at least society's expectations of a professional planner (Gunder and Hillier, 2004) . We argue that there need to be multiple`breaking points' (Fournier, 2002) or points of fixity. Yet it is necessary to prevent`the good' solidifying and becoming reified as the exclusive and exclusionary vision of a dominant elite (whether planners, politicians, corporate business people, or residents). This is an argument for a planning (and politics) of critical disagreement which can nevertheless find a place for utopic practiceöof course, the imperatives of`need' just put forward are also open to challenge.
Utopic strategic planning would be critical, transgressive, and transformative (Fournier, 2002) . It would not be a blueprint for an idealised`healthy' city but rather a vision for a trajectory of hope. Utopic thinking is concerned with immanence (after Deleuze). It promotes``movement and processes rather than`better states' ''; it is concerned with``journeys rather than destinations; it is about opening up visions of alternatives, rather than closing down on`a' vision of`a' better city or society; it is about what moves us to hope for, and to cultivate, alternative possibilities; and it is about establishing the conditions for the development of alternatives'' (Fournier, 2002, page 192) . This vision links back to the ambivalence of More's description of Utopia as both`good place' (eu topos) and`no place' (ou topos). Such ambivalence, however, opens up a space for movement.
Such a form of strategic planning would not offer a set of normative prescriptions or proscriptions. It would not finalise a fully coloured-in map of a good spatial form. Instead, it would slide from the normative to the performative and offer scenarios rather than models (Bonzani, 2004) , investigating deliberatively and inclusively various futuribles (de Jouvenel, 2004 ) (foreseeing rather than forecasting) based on people's hopes, desires and fantasies of the everyday. It would discover and map the actually existing utopian presents of people's lifeworlds and anticipate multiple futures as thè not-yet', immanent to the present (and past). Visions of the good, as Bauman (2003) suggests, are expressions of a perhaps universal need for transcendence:``we live always beyond ourselves, in a quest for something better '' (Levitas, 2003b, page 4) . However, as Bloch (1986a) tells us, the world is full of immanent transcendence; of spatial play which vacillates unresolvedly between the nowhere and the transcendent utopian good. It is a trajectory or movement; a hope for the future, of the future, which looks towards better futures rather than a perfect future. The utopic incorporates blemishes and dissonance (Geoghegan, 2003) , which are excluded from the utopian.
There remains the issue of substance or form versus process. Marin's (1984) idea of utopian discourse as a dialectic between form and process, between space and time, geography and history, which he termed`spatial play', could be useful here. Marin suggests that the spatial play which emerges from attempts at utopian planning will be an unresolved, nonclosed vacillation between the semiotics of the eutopian good place and the outopian no place. He describes such spatial play as utopic and suggests that``the utopic City is not an idea to be made real or the project of a City. It is the fiction of the conditions of possibility'' (Marin, 1984, page 262) .
Although Bloch (1986a) discusses historical geographical and architectural utopias, including town plans and ideal towns, he rather glosses over his answer to the issues of`h ow ... human profusion in clarity [can] be rebuilt'' (page 744);``the anticipation of a space adequate to man [sic]'' (page 745); a``constructed realm of freedom'' (page 744). Bloch advocates experimentation, pushing towards``the geographical line of extension, towards the ultraviolet area of the spectrum'' (1986a, page 792), a place of``wishful landscapes'' (page 793).
With experimentation comes both achievement and disappointment,``for failure and loss belong to the true essence of hope just as much as success and gain'' (Bloch, 1986b, pages viii^ix). Nevertheless, even failure can be constructive. Take the Australasian case of the Melbourne Docklands in the early 1990s, an experimental strategic plan excellently critiqued by Dovey (2005) in his volume, Fluid City. As Dovey (2005, page 132) describes, the`plan' for Docklands contained no planning or urban-design framework, although it did contain``a few indicative maps [which] contained stylish scribbles indicating possible functional zones, character areas and`optical fibre connections'.'' Spatial areas were surrounded by Marin's (1984) `flowing lines' that do not perform closure. The aim of the`plan' was to canvass development options relating to the city's bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games and the Multi-Function Polis. When both of these bids failed, a Docklands Authority was established which produced a`Proactive Context Map: Not a Master Plan' in 1993 and a Precinct Plan in 1995. Similar to the earlier 1990 document (Committee for Melbourne, 1990 ), the new not-plan simply listed a series of generalist development principles and divided the site into large precinct areas. There were no proposals for infrastructure and land in the precincts was available for whatever the developers and the market desired.``The words`plan' and`planning' were systematically replaced with`development',`co-ordination' and`promotion' '' (Dovey, 2005, page 135) .
We suggest that this example of strategic planning in practice represents an attempt (albeit unconsciously perhaps) at utopic planning. It was a schema in search of a concept, a structureless model (Marin, 1984, page 163) in which the`plan' became a textual system lacking any specific process, or rather, as Marin would suggest, its processes were to be composed pragmatically outside of it.
The freedom to act provided in the strategy became synonymous with risk and uncertainty for the developers and the public. Instead of leaping at an opportunity to acquire freehold ownership and relatively unrestricted development potential of large precincts of prime development land, developers held back, anxious about possible risks to any capital investment from the nature of development on adjacent precincts. The utopic spatial play of Melbourne Docklands remained Marin's``fiction of the conditions of possibility'' until a``genuine public plan'' (Dovey, 2005, page 153 ) was produced at the beginning of the new millennium.
Perhaps this brave attempt at a new practice of strategic planning required a more thought-out appreciation of actors' needs, hopes, and desires? Planning practitioners may have been comfortable working in a poststructuralist nonrepresentational manner, aiming to help other actors``to create new ways of living-thinking through which they can explore and add to the worldörather than offering ready-made solutions' (Thrift, 2004, page 83) . However, such thinking, as implemented, proved too unconventional and open for other actors, especially property developers and Melbourne residents. The potential benefits of utopic strategic planning remain to be realised. Perhaps hope requires some degree of regulation after all?
Possibly new ways of living^thinking can yet be developed to offer creative opportunities for both private-sector and public-sector developers which could be more effective in managing perceived market risk and in generating opportunities for immanence and transformation.
Conclusions: reinventing the mode of dreaming`u topian dreams _ never entirely fade away.' ' Harvey (2000, page 195) There is, and always will be, a social imaginary; of the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how things fit, or otherwise, between themselves and others, of their hopes, expectations, and fantasies (Taylor, 2004) . Such imaginaries are grounded in perceived facts (what is) and preferred norms (what ought to be).
The role of strategic-planning practice is to identify these social imaginaries and to manage the spatial manifestations that they imply. As such, what planning often produces is an`irreal' world of scientific or scientistic reality. Planners seek to manage into reality the things that they and other actors have already conjured up in their imaginations. A hoped-for, or dreaded, entity is made visible,`hearable',`smellable', through the naming and framing of planning processes (for example, the realisation of development, urban regeneration, the location of a waste dump or noxious industry) (Gunder, 2003b; Scho« n and Rein, 1994) . For those living adjacent to a waste dump, a noisy skatepark, or injecting rooms, how, then may planning be therapeutic? It cannot cure the ills of society nor can it realise a consensual vision of the good city. Therapy aids people to work out for themselves who they are and what are their hopes for the future. It does not propose a utopian ideal, but enables people to diminish their suffering (Forester, 2004, page 12) and to begin to work out a`better' future for themselves. Therapists are often required to mediate interindividual and intergroup conflicts. In mediation, they accept the fact that they are simply one among many participants in an ongoing dialogue.
Such practice resonates with Sandercock's (1998) vision of cosmopolis, yet, not as an impossible utopian end state that in its very failure sustains the fantasy that it can be realised, but, rather, as a movement towards a project of multiplicity and immanence where one may be able to live`together in difference'' with the Other. Without such fantasies of the`good', planning would cease to function. Moreover, successful therapy, especially of a Lacanian psychoanalytic nature, eschews control. It works dialogically with its`clients' to refine or define problems, to bring them, where possible, into symbolic articulation, and to spark trajectories of performative improvisations which are often unforecast and unforecastable (Amin and Thrift, 2002) .
Reality is incomplete and contains a plurality of latent potentialities from which choices must be made, both at a microlevel or personal level and at a macrourban level. Strategic planners have typically acted at the macrolevel, making difficult judgments as to what strategic option is`better' for the future of the city. Yet, as Fournier (2002, page 200) states,``undecidability, facing double-binds, deciding between different demands when there is nothing to tell us which way to go, creates the possibility for decision and responsibility, but also for alternatives. It opens up a conceptual space for rethinking the possible''. In this regard, our cities serve as``reservoirs of hope resulting from a generalized desire for a better future'' (Thrift, 2005, page 147 ).
This encapsulates utopic practiceöof grabbing the everyday moments of hope and of running with them. If utopic planning is about the opening up of potentialities it will require some mechanisms to prevent some group's or individual's visions of the utopian good or healthy city or society from becoming an exclusionary and oppressivè only alternative'. This is to resist the`musts' and`oughts' and to remain with`could' as a verb. The creative depends on the immanent transcendent actions of human beings rather than on an imperative ideal of the expert. This will entail, as Z í iz ek (2004, page 211) suggests, not only planners, but also developers and citizens``reinvent[ing] their very modes of dreaming''.
An awareness of the Lacanian Real may prove pivotal here. Knowledge can never be perfect, nor language comprehensive. Any articulation of the possible inherently lacks completeness. There is always a taint, a remainder outstanding,``the very stain or spot which disturbs and blurs our`direct' perception of reality'' (Z í iz ek, 1997, page 214). At best, any human desire for wholeness can only reside as a hope. But this is also a hope that can never be foreclosed by the imposition of some idealised impossible achievement. Immanence always gives rise to new hope; a multiplicity of spaces of the possible.
There is a role for further research into practicalities of utopic planning. How does thinking with hope function? How might planners, other actors in the development industry, and local citizens begin to perform`utopically'? What skills could planners develop for a practice based on hope? We also recognise that helping people to`add to the world' as Thrift (2004) suggests may nevertheless be exclusionary and oppressive for others (for example, fundamentalist regimes). There is no guarantee that therapy will lead to`good' outcomes for all its subjects. We believe, however, that strategic planners have a responsibility to listen to actors' often-conflicting perceptions of à good' city. The problematic of utopic planning practice becomes that of how to become responsive to, and to effect, Anderson's (2006) processes of transcendence that are of immanence in a dynamic, contingent world in which``what is not can still become'' (Bloch, 1986a, page 288) . Tuning into people's hopes will be important as hopes are the hidden signifiers of desire. Yet`tuning into' is not an opportunity for planners to present normative prescriptives of`ought' or`must' for the shape of the future city. As Bloch (1986a, page 288) writes,``there is an open dimension in people, and dreams, plans live within it''.`I am. We are. That is enough. Now we have to begin. '' Bloch (2000, page 1) 
